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SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/RPM

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [MARR](#) [NATO](#) [TU](#)  
SUBJECT: TURKEY'S PREPARATIONS FOR UPCOMING NATO SUMMIT

REF: ANKARA

Classified By: Pol-Mil Counselor Anthony Godfrey, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

¶1. (C) Summary: At a Deputies-level interagency meeting in January, the GOT agreed on the general outlines of its approach concerning the upcoming NATO conference. MFA contacts called the contributions Turkey has already announced for Afghanistan as "ambitious," and said Turkey is unlikely to commit significant additional resources absent a new political decision. Turkey will maintain its military presence in Kosovo and does not support KFOR moving to a "preventive deterrence" posture. The Turks continue to support NATO's Open Door policy, and believe the NATO-Georgia and NATO-Ukraine Commissions can facilitate the membership aspirations of these countries until MAP becomes less contentious of an issue for all Allies. Turkey will maintain its position on missile defense: any NATO project should cover all Allies and account for all threats. The Turks are disappointed about the lack of response to its December 2008 paper proposing a way forward on NATO-EU cooperation and do not anticipate any breakthroughs before or at the summit. The Turks are also concerned that NATO Air-CC Izmir might fall victim to a possible NATO recommendation to consolidate Component Command-level headquarters, a move that would send the wrong message about NATO's commitment to Turkey. Turkey's position regarding French reintegration was reported septel (ref a). End Summary

¶2. (C) A GOT Deputies level meeting on January 9 discussed GOT preparations for April NATO summit. MFA delegation was led by U/S Apakan and TGS was led by DCHOD Igsiz. The following reflects public comments made by senior MFA officials since the meeting and readouts provided by MFA working level contacts who attended the meeting.

Afghanistan  
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¶3. (C) Turkish commitments announced by Turkey's NATO PermRep (1.5 million euros to ANA Trust Fund, \$1 million to helicopter bridging initiative, \$5 million for election support), at the 1/14 Force generation conference (sending an info ops team, a CIMIC team, and a medical team to RC North), and those shared by the Turkish General Staff (TGS) with ODC-Turkey (one OMLT and willingness to sponsor Command and Staff College or Afghan Defense University) were already "ambitious", according to a working level MFA contact. He noted the second OMLT will likely deploy to the Kabul region, most likely in the August timeframe, when Turkey plans to resume command of RC-Capital. Given current economic environment, he said Turkey will not be able to do more without a high-level political decision.

## Kosovo: Maintaining Presence

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¶4. (C) The GOT plans to maintain its presence in Kosovo and does not support KFOR shifting its posture to a "preventive deterrence phase" any time soon as indications Turkey has received from Pristina and Belgrade suggest such a step would be premature. Turkey is also planning to begin bilateral efforts on developing an action plan in support of the KSF (Note: Turkish Training and Doctrine Command head visited Pristina recently), and will inform NATO of this plan.

## Enlargement, Georgia/Ukraine

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¶5. (C) The Open Door policy remains important to Turkey, and Turkey will soon complete its ratification of Croatia and Albania's accession protocols (ref b). The GOT remains ready to join consensus if one is reached on MAP for Georgia and Ukraine. The GOT believes that current arrangements (NATO-Georgia Commission, NATO-Ukraine Commission) are useful to keep reforms in these countries on track until all Allies agree on moving forward with MAP for these countries.

## NATO-EU

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¶6. (C) Turkey has not received any formal responses to the paper distributed by Turkey's NATO mission in December and is downbeat about the likelihood for progress. An MFA contact clarified that the "Informal NATO-EU Consultative Group" proposed in the non-paper would be Secretary General to Secretary General, not among all members. The "Friends of Afghanistan" proposal in the paper would include all NATO and EU member states as well as the UN and other contributing countries in Afghanistan, but would be a one-time event. Turkey remains unwilling to support regular contact (even informal ones) among all NATO and EU member states, fearing that this would further erode the Agreed Framework. She said the paper reflects a genuine effort on Turkey's part to find a way forward, taking into consideration earlier proposals, including from the French, but any progress is unlikely without some signal of EU willingness to respond to Turkey's legitimate ESDP requests and willingness to respect prior agreements.

## Missile Defense

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¶7. (C) An MFA expert on the missile defense issue emphasized that Turkey's core concern is that the principle of "indivisibility of security" be respected if there is a NATO Missile Defense system. He stressed Turkey's support for the language in the Bucharest Summit Declaration on missile defense. While Turkey recognizes that it would be impossible for any system to provide 100 percent coverage, NATO should work with all Allies to develop a list of high-value targets that should receive priority coverage. The MFA contact also highlighted the need for a realistic threat assessment accounting for all threats facing NATO, not just the ones emanating from Iran and Syria.

## Concern About Command Structure Review

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¶8. (C) MFA contacts said there are rumors that NATO's command structure review may include a recommendation to consolidate all headquarters at the Component Command level and below. They stress the importance of NATO HQ CC-Air Izmir not only for its military function, but also as a key "physical manifestation" of NATO in Turkey. They noted that CC Air Izmir provides a clear selling point of why NATO is good for Turkey in terms easy for the public to understand, and its closure would be the wrong signal for NATO to send to Turkey.

## Declaration of Alliance Security

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¶9. (C) At a conference organized by the Atlantic Council of Turkey on January 30-31, MFA International Security Affairs Director General Tomur Bayer said Turkey welcomed a "Declaration of Alliance Security" as a way to articulate NATO's role in today's security environment and pave the way for an update to the Strategic Concept. He highlighted core principles that should be covered in the declaration: indivisibility of security, Alliance solidarity, and NATO as

a consensus-based organization and an essential transatlantic link.

#### Comprehensive Approach

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¶10. (C) While stating NATO does not need its own "civilian capabilities," Bayer said it is important to recognize that there are times when security situations prevent other organizations from operating. In those instances, the Alliance should be able to draw from and utilize civilian assets which already exists within NATO member states.

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Jeffrey